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CHAKRAVARTHI RAM-PRASAD
I. Introduction: Advaita and the Question of
What is Denied When Self is Denied
In this essay, I will explore some ambiguities concerning what it is to affirm
or deny the self, through the view of the Hindu school of Advaita Veda¯nta
on the nature of the ‘I’ and its relationship to the reflexivity of conscious-
ness. In particular, I will seek to situate this elusive self between my
understanding of Dan Zahavi’s notion of the minimal self (Zahavi 2005;
2009; and this volume) and one reading of the significance of Thomas
Metzinger’s brief but provocative comparisons of his denial of self with
Advaita and Buddhism (Metzinger 2003: 549–50; 566).
As Zahavi (like others in this volume) observes in Section 4 of his essay,
the boundaries between self and no-self theories depend on what the self is
taken to be. Exposition of Buddhist denials of self in this volume range from
Siderits’ uncompromising reductionism all the way to Albahari’s defence of
a unitary and perspectival witness consciousness, which Zahavi points out
appears to preserve many of the defining characteristics of theories of self. So
it is clear that in the classical Indian traditions, within Buddhism itself, what
it means to deny self is a highly disputed matter. So it is with the Hindu
school of Advaita. As both Fasching’s paper and mine show, the Advaitic
assertion of self is not a straightforward matter, for other senses of self are
denied by them that look intuitively necessary for a theory of self.
1 I would like to thank Miri Albahari, Wolfgang Fasching, Jonardon Ganeri and, especially, Mark
Siderits for responses to an earlier draft of this paper.
Let me begin to situate my reading of Advaita by first commenting on
Albahari’s position (this volume; and 2006). Drawing on the early Buddhist
texts of the Pali Canon, Albahari argues that when the Buddhists deny ‘self ’,
they deny the ontological independence of a bounded consciousness tied to
ownership. She proposes that we understand insight as leading to recogni-
tion of the constructedness of this sense of self, leaving only what, she
maintains, is nirvana-consciousness—a perspectival, unitary, impersonal
witness-consciousness. Such consciousness will be consistent with the intel-
lectual conclusion that the subject of consciousness always eludes us, being
its own object.
Some might argue that this sounds remarkably close to the witness-con-
sciousness of Advaita explored in phenomenological terms by Fasching in this
volume. Of course, that in itself is not a philosophical criticism of Albahari’s
position: it merely alerts the reader to the complexity of the debate about the
borders of self/no-self. Later on, agreeing with Zahavi even while distin-
guishing the Advaitic position from his, I will make the point that Albahari’s
distinction between subjectivity and selfhood is one that Advaita rejects.
Although Fasching and I do not always use the same terminology to frame
the Advaitic position, we agree on the elusiveness of the Advaitic self: the
Advaitins reject both the generally understood Buddhist denial (contra Alba-
hari) of the unity of consciousness, as well as the insistence on individuated or
bounded inwardness that other Hindu schools require of self (a¯tman). Fasching
provides a phenomenological critique of what he takes to be the Buddhist
view that consciousness is momentary, by focusing on arguments for a
continuous conscious presence which has changing experiences. I look
more closely at a point he touches on, namely, the analysis of the use of the
first-person in Advaita, and the role that analysis plays simultaneously in the
denial of some senses of self and in the affirmation of a more mimimal unitary
conscious presence. So, in a sense, my paper follows up on Fasching’s, looking
at the way in which unitary presence is, in some sense, ‘self ’ for Advaitins.
2. The a¯tman as Self: Hindu Debates
The concept in Advaita that is going to be discussed in this essay is what may
be called a formal self—the a¯tman. In the West, much later, Kant is the
starting point for the discussion about formal selfhood, that is, selfhood that
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is not filled in by the specific content of experience (in short, personhood).
His distinction between ‘empirical apperception’ (or ‘inner sense’ or ‘inner
experience’) and ‘transcendental apperception’ which precedes all experi-
ence, sets in motion the tradition of analysis that distinguishes between the
specific features of any person’s sense of themselves as such-and-such a
person, and the impersonal consciousness of self that is the ground for the
possibility of the former (e.g. Kant: B132). In a very general sense, the
Hindu thinkers are somewhat akin to Kant. They too hold that what one
takes onself to be (the ‘sense of self ’ or literally, ‘“I”-ness’, aham
˙
ka¯ra),
through experiences of psychological states and bodily conditions, is always
shifting; Kant talks of ‘empirical consciousness’ that ‘depends on circum-
stances or empirical conditions’ (Kant: B140). Their concern is with some-
thing akin (in its function, rather than any explanatory feature) to Kant’s
‘pure apperception’, namely, the a¯tman’s priority to empirical conscious-
ness. There are, however, major disagreements among the Hindu or brah-
manical schools themselves about what that a¯tman is, such that it is
metaphysically distinguishable from shifting personhood.
David Velleman has made a distinction that, terminologically, and to a
large extent conceptually, parallels mine. He comments that if two thinking
substances share thoughts they are one person, whereas if there is access to
(presumably to the content and perspective of ) one another’s first-personal
thoughts, they are one and the same self (Velleman 1996: 75, n. 40; emphasis
Velleman’s). This is part of his larger distinction between what he calls
identity and reflexivity, the first holding between persons at different times,
the latter between subjects sharing first-personal terms (Velleman 1996: 65).2
In any case, it is the perspectival presence, a consciousness of subjective unity,
that is the point of disagreement in Indian philosophy. The question for the
Indians is whether what is phenomenologically given—the experience, and
the sense of a subject that is the ground condition for experience—is best
explained by a genuine unity of consciousness, or whether that unity is itself a
2 However, I approach the distinction with different concerns. Velleman calls the selfhood that holds
between persons across times a metaphysical relation, and that which holds between first-person-sharing
subjects a psychological one. To me, it seems as if it is the other way around: What makes for a person,
through identification, are psychological ties, together with other factors such as narrative and social
relationality, and what makes for subjective selfhood is the metaphysics by which a unity of conscious-
ness holds across time. I am unsure whether this means we are talking of different things, whether this is
purely terminological, or whether there is some important difference in approach here.
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construct of experience, and if it is agreed that there is unity of conscious-
ness, whether that points to a unified self. Buddhists, of course, generally
deny that there is a unified self which generates unity of consciousness;
through a wide range of positions, they maintain that that felt unity is
constructed. Broadly, Hindu realists, like the Nya¯ya and Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯
schools, hold that there is a unified self to which phenomenology points,
which is the condition for the construction of the empirical person
(although there are different theories abut how the nature and existence
of that self is affirmed). The Advaita school holds that there is a unity of




sa¯ (as also the schools of Jainism) clearly assert the
existence of a plurality of a¯tmans, understood as non-physical simple entities
with the quality of consciousness, with each being (human or otherwise,
whether a person or not) animated by an a¯tman. In short, while the a¯tman
does individuate each person, its identity is purely formal, in that each a¯tman
is ontologically distinct but has no further contentful distinctions, which
latter are all tied to the specific features of the person. For Nya¯ya, the a¯tman,
while the owner of the consciousness that thinks of a¯tman in the first place, is
at the same time an object in the world, one of the categories (pada¯rtha) that
constitute reality.3 In the rest of the essay, we will focus on Advaita, which
also asserts the existence of a¯tman, and therefore falls under those who
believe in ‘self ’ against the Buddhists, but turns out to have a very different
explanation for what that a¯tman is.
Advaita holds that consciousness can be understood in three ways. (One
could say metaphorically, that the latter two are ‘allotropes’ of the first—of
the same stuff ontologically, but with different structures and functions.)
There is brahman, which is simply the name for consciousness as the
universal and singular basis for all reality, and from which, in some sense,
all reality is no different. Then there is a¯tman, which is the general name for
3 In many ways, Nya¯ya’s robust metaphysical realism about the a¯tman is closer to Thomas Nagel’s
idea of an objective self, in which, while it is contingently true that the self has a perspective on the
world, it is itself only an element in that very world, so that the perspective it seeks is completely
objective (the famous ‘view from nowhere’) (Nagel 1986). Even more pertinently, its position in some
ways resembles Richard Swinburne’s ‘simple self ’ (1984), although we have to be careful about mapping
the details of Swinburne’s dualism onto the Hindu schools.
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consciousness understood as the ground of every individuated being. Final-
ly, there is the jı¯va, which, through its egoity (aham
˙
ka¯ra) is the empirical
consciousness in the locus of every individuated being. The gnoseological
project is the cultivation and disciplining of jı¯va-consciousness through
analyzing away the inauthentic features of self found in egoity, so that the
phenomenology of consciousness is purified to the point when only a¯tman
as formal consciousness is left to, and for, itself; at the point of formal
presence alone, the non-difference between the hitherto limited conscious-
ness and that of the universal consciousness is realized.
We are not concerned here with either the gnoseological discipline or the
cosmic ontology of Advaita. Rather, the focus will be on how consciousness
as we know it, that phenomenal undergoing whose presence is the starting-
point of investigation into selfhood, is understood in Advaita. In what
follows, we will concentrate on the interplay between (i) the concept of
aham
˙
ka¯ra—the construction of an ‘I’—in the individuated consciousness of
the jı¯va and (ii) the concept of a¯tman that is peculiar to Advaita. I want to
locate this exploration within the context of the denial and affirmation of
self found in Zahavi and Metzinger.
3. Metzinger’s No One and Zahavi’s Core Self
The contemporary research around which I want to build this analysis is a
juxtaposition of Thomas Metzinger’s denial of self and Dan Zahavi’s asser-
tion of a core self available in phenomenological consciousness. Let me
begin with Zahavi, starting with his interpretation of the phenomenologists
(Zahavi 2009). Zahavi reads Husserl and Heidegger as working with a
distinction between (i) a self which is not a person as such and (ii) the
personal self. Husserl says that the phenomenology of every possible subject
of experience has only a peculiar mineness (Meinheit), different from the
proper individuality of the person whose origin is in social life (Husserl
1989). Again, although this is a notoriously difficult topic, there are elements
inHeidegger’s concept of selfhood (Dasein) that appear to be getting at a core
conception of the self in the phenomenological mineness of consciousness,
when he distinguishes this from the everyday Dasein, which is an objectual
form. For him, selfhood has these different modes, the first addressed by the
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question of ‘who’, which speaks of existence itself, and the other by ‘what’,
which is that person who is present, or to hand, as the object of any
investigation (Heidegger 1962: 62–77).4 It would seem here that in both
cases, the phenomenological core of being is a self that does not contain the
constitutents of personal identity, the first-personal nature of awareness
being the minimal structure of phenomenal consciousness. In this, all the
brahmanical systems, barring Advaita, have a somewhat similar attitude
toward the a¯tman, which is picked out by the ‘I’ (aham
˙
).
Drawing on phenomenology, Zahavi has eloquently made the distinc-
tion between a phenomenologically constitutive minimal self which is the
perspectival subject, and a more extended sense of self, constituting person-
hood, given by a richer and more robust psycho-social being (Zahavi.
2005). Zahavi argues for a minimal conception of self, based on the phe-
nomenology of mineness: he derives this conception from his interpretation
of the German phenomenologists’ notion of in-each-case-mineness (Jemei-
nigkeit), which he reads as ‘formal individuation’. Again, although this leads
to specific aspects of phenomenological interpretation, it has striking paral-
lels with my reading of the nature of a¯tman, especially in the non-Advaitic
brahmanical schools, as having only formal identity. For the Advaitins, this
applies to the jı¯va, the a¯tman being the impersonal reflexivity of persistent
consciousness, as we will see below.
The idea that consciousness is primarily about phenomenality–the what-
it-is-likeness that conscious beings undergo–and the idea that that phenom-
enality contains within it the sense that a self undergoes it, were barely
recognized in Anglophone philosophy twenty years ago. But now, even
those who take their philosophy to derive from close study of cognitive
science, like Thomas Metzinger, agree on these two points. But Metzinger
has an interesting claim regarding the phenomenality of self, or the sense
within consciousness that such consciousness is that of a self. His scepticism
about the self starts with an examination of whether a study of the stable
physical world can reveal anything that might count as a self. His claim,
which has quickly become well known in the field, is that, ‘nobody ever
was or had a self ’ (Metzinger 2003: 1).
4 There is also the further, very tricky issue of Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and
inauthentic modes of being the self, which has some resonance with the brahmanical search for a
similar-sounding difference.
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It seems to me that there are two approaches to take to Metzinger. One
concerns his theory of the basis of consciousness (from which the illusion of
self is said to derive), and it is broadly physicalist. Another concerns his
account of how consciousness (howsoever constituted) generates a sense of
self that is somehow illusory. It is the latter in which I am interested. Of
course, this means that one can look at his entire book as a physicalist
reduction of self. But that these issues can also be read separately can be
seen in the fact that Metzinger himself explicitly compares his claims about
self with Plato, S´an˙kara, and the Buddhists—none of whom, he will know
very well, could possibly be physicalists about consciousness. Surely it is
with some deliberation that he makes these comparisons, and that seems
sufficient for my purpose of bracketing possible issues about the basis of
consciousness (i.e. whether it be physicalist or not), and looking at the way a
self is presented in phenomenality. (Despite his own effort at comparison,
nothing I say here implies that I read Metzinger as agreeing with the
ontological claims of Advaita, or most traditional Buddhist positions for
that matter.) My focus, then, is on Metzinger’s view that a model of self is
generated in and by consciousness, such that there appears to be an owner
for phenomenality.
Now, Metzinger cites both the Buddhists and, importantly for my
purposes, S´an˙kara (the founder of Advaita Veda¯nta), as holding a position
comparable to his own (Metzinger 2003: 550; 566), so far as the illusion of
self is concerned. With regard to the former, he compares his conception of
selflessness with the Buddhist conception of ‘enlightenment’; with the
latter, he finds a common concern to argue that what is identified as self is
in some metaphorical sense a ‘shadow’ of self-consciousness. I take it, then,
that he himself is not too concerned with the differences between his
scientific concerns and the gnoseological ones of the Indians.
Turning then to some details of Metzinger’s position, one line of his
argument against belief in a self is that the self-identification with body and
the rest by phenomenal awareness—that is to say, the identity that con-
sciousness takes by associating itself with its content—generates an illusion.
Insofar as both S´an˙kara and the Buddhists maintain that what consciousness
constructs or generates as an individual self, from out of its phenomenal
inputs, is an illusion at some level, then Metzinger is right in citing them
both. He argues that the phenomenology of consciousness is itself wrong
when it appears to yield a self to whom that consciousness belongs. His
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complex and ground-breaking book is impossible to summarize but the
relevant argument (Metzinger 2003: 547–99) is that consciousness is a system
whose function of transparently representing the world includes building
into itself a perspectival grasp of that world, and that perspectival quality
consists in a model of a phenomenal self whose construction is transparent
(i.e. not apparent) to the conscious system. In other words, just so the
conscious organism can function for survival, it requires representing the
world from a (its) perspective; and the way to do that is to generate a sense
that there is someone, a subject from whose perspective the world is
experienced, and to whom that experience happens. In that way, all the
distinctions and lack of confusion between ‘you’ and ‘me’ that ordinary
consciousness possesses are delivered. But there is no real self which is the
subject of experience, if by subject is meant a metaphysical entity whose
capacity to be conscious explains the perspectival nature of consciousness’
presence to itself. There is only a model of a phenomenal self built into the
representational functions of consciousness. It is impossible to both preserve
that sense of self and become convinced that intuitively there is no such self.
Either ‘I’ continue to function with that illusion necessary for perspectival
functioning or—radically—the consciousness ‘here’ reconfigures its entire
global model of what it is to be phenomenal and enters a cognitively lucid
way of functioning in which there is no self-ascription of experience at all
(Metzinger 2003: 626–7).
It is this latter possibility that prompts Metzinger to suggest that there are
similarities in his view with Asian notions of enlightenment. In short,
Metzinger is not only reducing away the social dimensions of personhood,
he is also saying that the I-ness of phenomenal consciousness is just a model
and not ‘real’—by which he means not a metaphysical object.
Zahavi, in contrast, reads phenomenal consciousness as that of a self: he
affirms ‘the subject(ivity) of experience’ (Zahavi 2005: 146), in effect argu-
ing that subjectivity simply is the presence of a subject in, and of, awareness.
The self that Zahavi is interested in asserting as minimal but real is precisely
what is provided in phenomenal consciousness (or ‘experience’): a persistent
presence in its own occurrence (Zahavi 2005: 128). But this indicates that he
may not necessarily be involved in a metaphysical disagreement with
Metzinger so much as a conceptual one. If Metzinger starts by granting
that the phenomenality of the self is given—that consciousness contains
consciousness that it is/appears to be a self ’s consciousness—then Metzinger
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has granted enough for his, Zahavi’s, purposes.5 Zahavi is not interested in
defending conventional Western theories of a substantial self that Metzinger
rejects.
Two main points relevant to my interpretation of Advaita emerge: First,
there is a self-model in phenomenal consciousness, which is not a self
(Metzinger 2003: 550); under this model, where presence is transparent to
consciousness, phenomenality is represented as a relationship between a
perspectival subject (the ‘self ’) and its objects. In that sense, Metzinger does
bear similarity to Advaitins and Buddhists, in charging that the self built out
of the interaction of consciousness and world (howsoever their ontological
status is conceived) is illusory, and not a legitimate type of selfhood.6
Secondly, however, in stating that, if phenomenal consciousness does not
depend on an independent self whose consciousness it is, then there is no
self at all, Metzinger is only denying particular conceptions of selfhood,
which require ‘an “individual” in the sense of philosophical metaphysics’
(Metzinger 2003: 563). That would include such theories as those of the
Hindu schools of Nya¯ya or Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, for whom consciousness is a quality
of the a¯tman, and therefore secondary to its existence. For Naiya¯yikas or
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, if phenomenal consciousness has perspective (i.e. is structured
as being from some specific perspective, that of the self ) that is only because
there is actually a self which possesses that consciousness. For them, the
transparency of consciousness to its objects is explicable through there being
a subject-self which directly grasps those objects at all only because it
possesses the determinative quality of consciousness (Ram-Prasad 2001:
chs. 1 and 2).
In arguing that consciousness is not intrinsically that of an individual
self, even a minimally phenomenological one, Metzinger does offer a view
that has something in common with Advaita and with (most conventional
interpretations of ) Buddhism. Zahavi might simply decide that that is
sufficient to call that consciousness a minimal self, just because that is how
5 Zahavi in correspondence.
6 Zahavi, by contrast, wants a different account of this sort of self, an extended and richer self which is
equally real, but on an account different from the strict phenomenological one. Incidentally, there is
much in the classical Indian material on such a view, in which the socially embedded person, regardless
of his or her constructivity, is still an ethically relevant and real entity, whose metaphysical status does not
alter the significance of virtue and conduct. This is the so-called ‘human-ends’ (purs
˙
a¯rtha)-oriented view
concerned with dharma or the ordered, virtuous life.
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experience phenomenologically represents it. There is then an ambiguity
over how the very idea of a ‘self ’ (in the a¯tmanic sense) should be under-
stood. This ambiguity over whether what is left as core consciousness is a
self or not is precisely what is evident in the Advaitic use of a¯tman.
For the Advaitins, authentic self (a¯tman)—the core, undeniable presence
that is the ground of phenomenological content—is not about individuality.
The sense of an individual locus of consciousness—consciousness as jı¯va—is
not the final stage of analysis. This is because, according to them, jı¯va
consciousness functions through the instruments (ka¯ran
˙
a) and objects (ka¯rya)
of embodiment (s´arı¯ratva) (S´an˙kara 1917: 254–5). Perception and other cog-
nitive activities that are structured in the subject-object relation are, of course,
possible only in consciousness individuated through its psychophysical appa-
ratus of mental operations, senses, etc. But that sense of individuated selfhood
is consciousness functioning (kr.tam) through ‘adjuncts’ (upa¯dhi-s), that is, the
intellectual faculty (buddhi) of conceptualization, the perceptual organs, etc.;
consciousness is not that of an individual self (S´an˙kara 1913: 487). The
Advaitin rejects the idea of an individual self which happens to possess the
capacity for consciousness. Rather, what the Advaitin calls a¯tman is not the
‘seeing of the seen’—because that would simply imply a subject in relation to
its object—but the ‘seer of the seeing’ itself (S´an˙kara 1914: 161–2)—in short,
reflexive subjectivity as such. Advaita therefore has a complex and ambiguous
view of the perspectival nature of consciousness: on the one hand admitting
that that is constitutive of subjectivity, and on the other denying that that
implies an individual subject. It is in its analysis of the ‘I’ of consciousness that
we perhaps find a radical way of cutting across the apparently rival accounts of
Metzinger and Zahavi.
4. Exploring the ‘I’ and its Peculiarities in Advaita
We now turn to looking at the details of the Advaitic analysis of ‘I’ and the
way in which this analysis shows how it may be possible to deny egology,
even while affirming a unified consciousness that can be termed ‘self ’.
Philosophical systems committed to a metaphysically robust self routinely
relate it to the reflexive pronoun; whatever the precise details of their theory,
they tend to see the ‘I’ as somehow naming a self. In the classical Indian
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schools, there is a common gnoseological concern to determine features of
selfhood that mislead the seeker into continued entanglement with the world
of suffering and metaphysical misunderstanding. Carefully delineating the
many features of bodily, psychological, ethical, relational, and social existence
that make up a sense of selfhood, the philosophers argue that these are not, in
fact, truly constitutive of one’s being, and that it is only through profoundly
transformative realization of this truth that there is liberation from the con-
ditions of suffering. Of course, the Buddhist schools deny there is anything
ultimately constitutive of being at all, although they disagree amongst them-
selves as to how such a misleading constitution of selfhood occurs and how it





a¯dvaita and Dvaita, generally tend to distinguish be-
tween these misleading senses of selfhood—which they term egoity (aham
˙
-
ka¯ra, the made-up-‘I’)—and the authentic self—which is picked out in some
way by the reflexive pronoun ‘I’ (aham
˙
).
In order to appreciate the strangeness of the Advaitic position, we can
compare it to more intuitive accounts given by other Hindu schools. In the
school of Mı¯ma¯m
˙





example, Kuma¯rila argues for two things at the same time: the self makes
infallibly veridical reflexive reference to itself through ‘I’-thoughts which
take it as their object, yet, the features to which these ‘I’- thoughts relate the
self, like bodily qualities and activities, are themselves not part of the self. On
the one hand, the very locution ‘my self ’ (mama¯tmeti) indictates that the
primary meaning (mukhya¯rtha) of the first-person cannot apply to anything
other than the self. On the other, locutions regarding my body indicate a
distinction between the self and the body (Kuma¯rila: 125–134). Pa¯rthasa¯rathi
Mis´ra defends this combination of claims. He says that the cognizing subject
is the object of the ‘I’-thought (aham
˙
pratyaya). When one apprehends
(para¯mr.s´ati), one apprehends two things: the self as ‘I’ and something else
as ‘this’. At the same time, when the apprehension is of the form, ‘I am thin’
or ‘I go’, the being thin and the going are distinct from the self. This is
grammatically indicated by the use of the genitive case, for what is actually
implied is, ‘this, my body, is thin’, and what is mine (the being thin or





between self and its embodiment creates the illusion that, in the case of
qualities pertaining to the embodied self (the person), those qualities are
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Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas maintain that awareness requires embodiment: without body,
there is no consciousness for the self.7
The Naiya¯yikas have a somewhat similar view of the matter. The ‘I’ picks
out the self. The self (i.e. a¯tman) cannot have experience (bhoga) without
embodiment (Va¯tsya¯yana: 1.1.22; 35). Va¯tsya¯yana also states that the funda-
mental erroneous cognition (mithya¯jn˜a¯nam) consists in taking what is not the
self as the self; this is the delusion (moha) of egoity. Egoity consists in taking
the body (s´arı¯ra), the senses (the indriya-s), the mind (manas), feelings
(vedana¯-s) and the intellectual faculty (buddhi) to be self (Va¯tsya¯yana: 4.2.1,
p. 288). This is not to say that these thinkers reject any association of
selfhood with psychological states or the conception of their body as an
object in the world. They understand, to repeat the point made at the
beginning of the essay, that this extended sense of self is intimately
connected with the rich features of the life of a person, that only the direct
way of referring to the embodied person is possible in ordinary language. All
conduct and experience require understanding oneself to be a person who
takes a trajectory through the world. But the gnoseological interest in these
features of extended selfhood—emotions, attachments, revulsion, relation-
ships, physical features, bodily activities—lies in analysing their separateness
from the irreducible self, the a¯tman, which they believe is picked out by the
referential use of the ‘I’, independently of the ascriptions of personhood.
I have given these other views in order to demonstrate that many
brahmanical thinkers tend to do three things simultaneously: (i) They assert
that what the ‘I’ designates, without ascription of particular states or quali-
ties, is the a¯tman, that is, the authentic self. (ii) They deploy, in contrast, the
concept of egoity—‘I’-ness—as a fraudulent (sopadha) sense of selfhood
(Udayana: 377) which, for all its psychological and social vitality (or, indeed,
precisely because of that), needs to be analyzed insightfully in the gnoseo-
logical project of attaining liberation. (iii) At the same time, they allow any
and every conscious state—those that actually occur in life—invariably to
take the form of associating the ‘I’ with qualities (sick, sad, tall). So the
condition of life consists in the ascription of a sense of self that is always
extended beyond what the self truly is. (That the analytic distinction
7 J. L. Mackie makes a similar distinction (although, of course, for very different purposes), saying that
there are two different rules for the use of ‘I’: one linking it directly to the human being, and the other, to
the subject, whatever it may be (Mackie 1980: 56).
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between the transcendental ‘I’ and all its ascribed qualities is in fact a meta-
physical one between true and inauthentic selves is a further argument within




as and Naiya¯yikas argue that the ‘I’, when
stripped of all ascriptions, is the self free of all personal qualities.)
The Advaitins, on the other hand, say something much more radical: the
‘I’ itself is part of egoity, everything about it is made up. The ‘I’ simply does
not pick out a¯tman. They are sensitive to the actual function of the ego in
the life of human beings, but given their interpretation of a¯tman, the
individuation denoted by the ‘I’ is precisely what they must reject.
S´an˙kara notes that there can be no account of the epistemic life which
does not involve the use of the reflexive pronoun in all its psychological
complexity. Without the appropriation (abhima¯na—a possessive pride) that
‘I’ and ‘mine’ deliver, there can be no epistemic subject (prama¯tr.) and the
operation of the epistemic instruments (the prama¯n
˙
as). Va¯caspati, in his
commentary on S´an˙kara, explains how this extended and gnoseologically
misleading sense of self functions through two types of paradigmatic asser-
tions: ‘I am this’ and ‘this is mine’. The first, primary claim of identity
between a¯tman and the bodily apparatus individuates the self, and distin-
guishes it from other loci of such identification. The secondary claim is an
appropriation of relationships, in which the individuated being’s identity
becomes extended socially; ‘this is my son’ is Va¯caspati’s example. The self ’s
two-fold (dvividha) appropriation sustains the march of the world (lokaya¯-
tram
˙
), including the means for the attainment of liberation (Va¯caspati:154).
The Advaitins go so far as to say that all uses of the reflexive pronoun only
pick out the extended self, the person, and not the authentic, ‘innermost
a¯tman’ (pratyaga¯tman). The Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka might say that the misleading inti-
macy that leads to erroneous identification is between the ‘I’ and the
qualities attributed through the ‘this’. But the Advaitin says this intimacy is
in fact between consciousness as such and the ‘I’ (which are co-present like
fire and wood are burner and burnt, in Sures´vara’s picturesque analogy).
The ‘I’ too is truly just a ‘this’ for the seer (Sures´vara: 3.59, 3.61). This
suggests that even the barest awareness of individuation—howsoever
stripped of specific thoughts or feelings or perceptions—does not desig-
nate the a¯tman; it only designates the individuated self represented in
consciousness (i.e. jı¯va-consciousness).
In common with the other schools, the Advaitins agree that the ‘I’ picks
out an object idiosyncratically: the user of the ‘I’ succeeds in referring to that
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very user and it alone. They agree with their brahmanical interlocutors that the
states the ‘I’-usage represents the subject as being are not themselves part of
the authentic self. But they part company with the others when it comes to the
claim that the bare consciousness of self present in the ‘I’ is in fact the a¯tman.
Here wemust be very careful in seeing just what is going on. The Advaitins do
not disagree with the others that the ‘I’-form picks out something uniquely
and idiosyncratically, and that, moreover, there is a plurality of such entities,
each with its own locus of awareness. But whereas the others call this the
a¯tman, and take it as an element in the ultimate order of metaphysical
existence, the Advaitins call it the form of consciousness-as-jı¯va. In other
words, they argue that ‘I’ only designates a constructed self, namely, a repre-
sentation of consciousness individuated by and through its psychophysical
locus. What the Advaitins call a¯tman, however, is not the self of individ-
uated consciousness. For them, a¯tman is simply the consciousness itself that
does the taking (we can say, using the Metzingerian term, ‘the modeling’)
of itself as an individual. Consciousness as such is not designated even by
the bare ‘I’.
If by the use of the word ‘self ’ we mean necessarily an individuated locus
of consciousness idiosyncratically designated by the ‘I’, then the a¯tman of the
Advaitins is not a self at all, for they reject mineness as a fundamental feature
of reality, arguing that appropriation is a mark of the inauthentic self. At the
same time, there is a more nebulous usage of ‘self ’, which adverts to the
quintessential nature, the very basis of a being’s reality, which is what makes
it what it is. Now, our standard view of the fundamental nature of a being is
construed in terms of distinguishing it from what it is not. In the other
brahmanical systems, the ‘I’ functions admirably to thus distinguish the
a¯tman which uses it idiosyncratically from all others who use it in their
own way. So we find it reasonable to think that the a¯tman should be
translated as ‘self ’ for them, howsoever different this usage is from the richer
notions of personhood found in the larger tradition. But if the whole point
of the Advaitic a¯tman is to deny ultimate distinction between individual loci
of consciousness and treat it simply as the generic name for reflexive
presence, then it does seem strange to use the word ‘self ’ for it.
What then does the ‘I’ pick out (because, after all, it does function to
designate something idiosyncratically)? The ‘I’ in fact refers to the mind, for
the Advaitins. The mind for them is an internal organ or mechanism
(antah.karan
˙
a), in itself part of the physical functions of the body. The
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classical Indians, of course, had no knowledge of the microstructures of the
brain, but by taking the mind to be some sort of ‘subtle’ (su¯ks.ma) but
physical internal cognitive organ, they treat it very physicalistically, as
something that can be described entirely through its content. Consciousness
is truly only that aspect of phenomenology which is reflexive, that is, the
constant accompaniment of being present, which renders an event some-
thing that the subject undergoes. But what consciousness takes to be
happening to its (constructed) subject is in fact a process represented in
the content of the mental processes with which it is associated. The analytic
separation of awareness from, say, my feeling of sadness and its ascription, is
phenomenologically occluded: I feel sad and recognize it thus; the con-
sciousness here is not aware that the sadness is only associated with a sense of
mineness which is itself constructed. There are three elements for the
Advaitin here: the ‘I’; the sadness as a state of the subject, as detected by
the internal organ; and the awareness that this is so ascribed to the super-
imposed ‘I’. The Advaitins urge us to recognize that the occlusion is because
of egoity. Egoity is that function of the mind whereby the (non-aware)
mind’s contents are associated with the (a¯tmanic) awareness, in that aware-
ness is not aware that it has constructed a first-person ascription: in other
words, the constructed self is transparent to consciousness.
The ‘I’, then, lies in the domain of objective usage, albeit in the specially
restricted indexical sense that it can be used truthfully only by each user
him/herself, where this user-specificity is determined by the location of
consciousness within a body. In fact, in Sures´vara’s formulation (Sures´vara:
3.60), first-personal ascriptivity is a specific mental function: it is the opera-




a) as delimited (avacchinna) by the ‘I’-
state (aham
˙





paridha¯ya), the self associates itself with things external to it, whether
they be helpful or harmful’ (Sures´vara: 3.60). Mental functions occur in two
ways: first, they operate in the ‘revealer-revealed’ (avabha¯saka-avabha¯sya)
relationship with the self, in which consciousness reveals (or takes itself to
relate to) the ‘I’-function of the mind; this is why consciousness has the
illusion that it is familiar with an object called ‘itself ’. The mind becomes
the idiosyncratically possessed object of consciousness, through the unique
use of the ‘I’ in ascribing its contents to that consciousness. Second, mental
functions operate in a helped-helper (upaka¯rya-upaka¯raka) relationship with
objects, in that the objects help to structure ‘I’-thoughts (‘I want this pen’; ‘I
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do not want that poison’). It thereby allows consciousness to take itself to
relate meaningfully with the world, even if erroneously.8
The Advaitins themselves obey the normal grammatical uses of the first-
person pronoun, although they do mark out their special usage of the ‘I’ as
mind-wrought object too. For the former, they use the conventional cases
(vibhaktyah.) for the first person, for example the genitive is ‘mine’ (mama).
But when signifying the use of the ‘I’ as a metaphysically important object—
that which is associated with, but is not the self (a¯tman) as such—they are
capable of treating it as a special sort of proper name, so that, with the
genitive case, they use the locution ‘I’s’ (ahamasya) like one would use
‘Ra¯ma’s’ (ra¯masya).9 Sures´vara also says that the self (a¯tman) is the secondary
meaning (laks.ya¯rtha) of ‘I’ by virtue of its association with the mind. The ‘I’
is extremely helpful for self-realization (a¯tmadr.s´t
˙
ya), and the self should
therefore be seen to be implied by the use of the ‘I’ (Sures´vara: 2.55).
5. The Elusive Advaitic Self
What this account shows is a position that interestingly combines features of
Metzinger and Zahavi. Regarding the former, for the Advaitin too there is
no one indeed. For Metzinger, there is consciousness here that generates a
sense of ‘I’, as that which picks out an individual self; phenomenal self-
consciousness represents mineness, a sense of ownership whose construction
is not spotted by the consciousness which constructs it, because its modeling
is transparent (Metzinger 2003: 562). For the Advaitin, consciousness of
individuality is an illusion: a¯tman is not one particular entity but the
consciousness which mistakenly generates individuality.10
Regarding Zahavi, the Advaitin shares the notion of core consciousness
with him. Zahavi’s argument is that phenomenological investigation simply
presents the ‘subjectivity of experience’, the denial of which (by Metzinger)
8 Ibid.; Balasubramanian’s editorial commentary here is extremely helpful.
9 I must thank Nirmalya Guha for his insightful understanding of this usage in Advaita.
10 Of course, this consciousness is also transcendental for the Advaitin, for in the manner of Kant, it is
the prerequisite, the ground, for the phenomena of individual consciousness. Incidentally, Metzinger is
dismissive of Kant, and resolutely avoids the terminology of transcendental metaphysics, but one could
ask whether his ‘system’, which models the phenomenal self, is not in some sense a transcendental
requirement. The possible response that reductive physicalisms do not require transcendental arguments
requires a discussion that will take us beyond the remit of this essay.
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seems ‘unnecessarily restrictive’ (Zahavi 2005: 128). He is aware that his
minimal self is ‘overly inclusive’ and the comparison with Advaita’s insis-
tence on its notion of consciousness being also one of self certainly seems
very lax too. In general, his careful distinction between core and extended
self also fits my interpretation of Advaita comfortably. In his essay in this
volume, he reiterates his view that the ‘givenness’ of the unity of conscious-
ness is also a ‘mineness’. But, unlike Zahavi, the Advaitins will resist seeing
this reflexivity as a perfectly natural appropriative and ascriptive ‘mine’. For
them, any mineness is empty unless it is about some specific quality or
representation—but then, that is not the core consciousness that provides
the very possibility of phenonemology but is itself not found in phenome-
nological content. Earlier Advaitins did not recognize immediately that the
combination of denying the ‘I’ and affirming the presence of unified
consciousness requires more understanding of how consciousness relates
to perspectival phenomenology. Later Advaitins concentrated on this via
the theory of ‘auto-luminosity’ (svatah.-praka¯s´a va¯da). We will now turn
briefly to this theory, in order to see how they seek to approach perspectival
presence without first-personal usage.
6. The Reflexivity of Consciousness
Analytic philosophers have sometimes thought that the phenomenal pres-
ence of consciousness to itself (what the phenomenologists had talked about
as the essential mark of the self ) is actually about the self-consciousness of
any particular conscious state. The Indian debate that can address the mix-
up of the phenomenology of mineness and the analytic self-consciousness of
consciousness is actually the one about whether, whatever the way in which
self-consciousness is secured, the consciousness that possess that feature is a
persistent entity or not. The question of whether a stream of self-conscious
states—that is, whether phenomenal continuity—implies a self, is now
being tackled in the philosophy literature (Dainton 2005: 1–25). An extend-
ed and elaborate debate on this, of course, is central to the Buddhist-Hindu
debates of classical India. The outline of a specific Advaitic critique of the
Buddhist position therefore also shows the potential of that hoary debate to
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contribute to current inquiry into the relationship between individual
moments of self-consciousness and the possibility of a conscious self.
The classical Indians do not conflate these two debates. They have a
separate debate on the constitutive nature, the presence as it were, of con-
sciousness. This takes the form of auto- and hetero-luminosity (svatah
˙
and
paratah. praka¯s´a) theories, on how consciousness ‘illuminates’, that is, in what
phenomenality consists. This debate is initiated with the terminologically
different, but conceptually similar, svasam
˙
vedana doctrine of the Buddhist
Digna¯ga. In effect, it looks at the self-consciousness of consciousness, but
clarifies that it is not about the question of the self (even if intimately
connected to it).
In general, earlier Advaitins simply assert the self-evident nature of (the
phenomenality of ) consciousness to consist in its reflexive access to itself:
the self ’s intrinsic nature is of being ever-present (sarvada¯ vartama¯nasvabha¯-
vatva¯t) (S´an˙kara 1917: 2.3.7; 585). (Fasching too, in this volume, deals with
the notion of presence in Advaita.) In short, the self has nothing to mediate
its access to itself. By contrast, knowledge of things is mediated by transac-
tions involving epistemic instruments and their objects (prama¯naprameyavya-
vaha¯ra). To say that something is known is for there to be (i) the subject of
knowledge (prama¯ta¯), (ii) its object and (iii) the mediation of epistemic
instruments such as perception and its organs. But the self has no such
distinction between itself and its awareness of itself. So the self is not an
object of knowledge (Sures´vara: 2.98; a¯tmano aprameyatvam). By ‘object’, the
Advaitins mean precisely that—things in the world that are accessible to
epistemic instruments. The Naiya¯yikas would hold that that exhausts all
the elements of any ontology. But the Advaitins cannot mean quite that:
indeed, quite the opposite, because in their ontology, there ultimately and
irreducibly exists only universal consciousness—precisely that which is not
an object! So they must be distinguishing between that entity alone which is
real—consciousness—and objects of knowledge, which have some sort of
sub-real, provisional, transactional existence.11 In that sense, they are com-
mitted to cognitive closure, a denial that epistemic states can ever take the
subjectivity of the epistemic agent—that is, consciousness as such—as their
content.
11 On the Advaitic position on the status of the world of objects through a variety of concepts, see
Ram-Prasad 2002.
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As it became clear that others—especially the Naiya¯yikas and the different
sub-schools of the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas—interpreted the nature of the self and its
consciousness very differently, later Advaitins sought to define more pre-
cisely their understanding of the presence of consciousness to itself as its
‘autoluminosity’.12 The aim of these later works13 is to clarify that the
distinctive and constitutive feature of consciousness is its transparency to
itself: all content is presented as if to the perspective of a particular subject,
while in reality, consciousness is the ‘pure’ presence of itself to its own
occurrence, which does not in fact enter into the content of specific mental
states. Following the earlier Advaitic position, the most important feature of
the definition of the autoluminosity of consciousness is that it is unknow-
able (avedyatva). This is not the self-defeating claim that nothing can be
known about consciousness, since that very fact could be known about it.
Madhusu¯dana points out that what is known is the theoretical claim about
the nature of consciousness as unknowable in the strict sense in which
knowable things are objects of epistemic procedures like perception and
inference, but consciousness itself is that which is aware (i.e. that which is
only ever the subject) of the claims regarding its nature and never the actual
object.
The Advaitins therefore deny many different sorts of self, and what they
affirm is hardly self in any recognizable way, apart from the reflexivity of
consciousness being, in some very abstract sense, the essence of conscious-
ness, the ‘self ’ of consciousness. In effect, they assert a stable subjectivity, or
a unity of consciousness through all the specific states of individuated
phenomenality, but not an individual subject of consciousness. What we
see here is that, unlike Zahavi (in this volume, section 4, response 2), the
Advaitins split immanent reflexivity from ‘mineness’. At the same time, like
him, they do not think selfhood can be distinguished from subjectivity.
They therefore insist that they are committed to self and reject no-self
views.
12 A more detailed and systematic taxonomy of position, looking at Yoga¯ca¯ra-Madhyamaka (the







sa¯, Nya¯ya and Advaita is given in chapter 2 of Ram-Prasad 2007.
13 The locus classicus is Citsukha’s Tattvapradı¯pika¯ (Citsukha: 1–5) with Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯’s
clarifications on the same topic in the Advaitasiddhi (Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯: 767–9).
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7. Conclusion
Metzinger’s argument that the constructedness of the individual self is
transparent to consciousness appears to apply equally to both Advaita and
most schools of Buddhism. If we set aside the historical development of a
Buddhist commitment to the view that all elements of reality, consciousness
included (or consciousness alone if it constructs the rest of reality), are
momentary, then Metzinger might be made to fit some reinterpretations
of both Advaita and Buddhism. After all, in this volume, Albahari sets aside
the reality of momentariness within a Buddhist denial of self. However,
if more conventional interpretations of Buddhism preserve the doctrine
of momentariness, then a Metzingerian account that does not appear to
require any denial of a unified system of consciousness, nor ask explicitly for
consciousness to be a sequence of momentary states, appears more easily to
allow of a cross-cultural comparison with Advaita than with Buddhism.
This is because the heart of the Advaitic critique of Buddhism is a two-fold
argument: one in support of the unity of consciousness, and the other
against the doctrine of momentariness (S´an˙kara 1917: 2.2.18–25). (Fasching
has more to say about both these Advaitic arguments, albeit from another
text attributed to S´an˙kara.) But in the end, the interesting point about
Metzinger is that he seems to offer possibilities for cross-cultural articula-
tions (both Advaitic and Buddhist) of how our most robust and intuitive
sense of self might be an illusion, intrinsic though it may be to how
consciousness functions in relation to the world.
Zahavi certainly yields riches for the cross-cultural philosophy of self, his
concept of the minimal self being very amenable to being read through
Advaitic lenses. The slight differences in emphasis between my paper and
Fasching’s—especially my argument that the Advaitic position is somewhat
more radical than Zahavi when it comes to the first-person—drives home
the point that there is still much to be done with such genuine cross-cultural
philosophical engagement.
Advaitins, then, within the specific debate about the nature and existence
of the formal subject-self (a¯tman) of phenomenal consciousness, while
seeming to side against the Buddhists in affirming the existence of a¯tman,
mean something very different about it than the objective self with the




that the irreducible essence of being is subjectivity, rather than an objective
self with the quality of being conscious, seems somewhat akin to some
versions of Buddhist denial of a¯tman. Advaitins also take that subjectivity to
be unified, not consisting of a process of momentary events, while yet
denying that the use of the ‘I’ accurately picks out such a unified conscious-
ness. The a¯tmanic self of Advaita is indeed an elusive one. That was its
gnoseological attraction to the tradition and that is its philosophical interest
today.
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